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Taxing Global Trading: An Appropriate Testing Ground for
Formula Apportionment?
Kelvin K. Leung
INTRODUCTION
The eighties were the decade of "globalization," a time
when economic, social, and political thought took on an increas-
ingly global perspective.' Significant results of this trend have
been the emergence of global markets 2 and the rise of global
trading3 of financial instruments.4 The international trading
1. For a discussion of the rise of globalization, see Barry Gillman, October
Crashes Prove Global Outlook a Luxury No More, PENSION WORLD, Apr. 1990,
at 14.
2. One commentator has defined "global market" as a market "that has
no national boundaries, to which participants - be they investors, issuers, bor-
rowers, or savers - from all over the world have access, in which price is estab-
lished by supply and demand from around the world, not from a single domestic
market, and in which transactions can be effected on a 24-hour basis or close to
it." Richard Debs, Globalization of Financial Markets: 'What is Happening
and Why,' INT'L Bus. LAw. 198, 199 (1987) [hereinafter Debs, Globalization].
See also Richard Debs, The Development of International Equity Markets, 4
B.U. INT'L L.J. 5, 6 (1986).
3. This Note adopts Charles Plambeck's definition of "global trading" as
used in his article, The Taxation Implications of Global Trading, 48 TAx NOTES
1143 (1990) [hereinafter Plambeck, Taxation Implications]. According to his
definition, "global trading" refers to "the capacity of financial intermediaries to
execute customer orders and to take proprietary positions in financial products
in markets around the world and around the clock." Id. at 1143-44. This activ-
ity is also sometimes called "twenty-four-hour trading."
4. The degree of globalization varies greatly among financial instruments
and thus their tax treatments inevitably differ. This Note, which focuses on the
tax issues rather than the financial aspects of global trading, discusses financial
products generally rather than focusing on specific financial instruments.
Financial instruments of all kinds are traded on a twenty-four-hour basis.
The main instruments are currencies/foreign exchange, debt instruments, some
equities and even derivative products such as forwards, futures, options and
swaps. Id. at 1144. Commodities like oil, gold and other precious metals are also
traded on a twenty-four-hour basis. Debs, Globalization, supra note 2, at 199.
The foreign exchange market is the largest global financial market. In 1987
alone, it had a daily turnover approaching $200 billion. Id. Debt instruments
have also been globally traded for years, initially in the Eurodollar syndications.
Stephen Kindel, Markets Far and Wide: Global Trading is Becoming an Frfi-
cient Way to Raise and Shift Capital, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 106, 107. In
the 1980s, trading in Treasury issues became one of the fastest growing areas in
global trading. This growth resulted from a skyrocketing United States govern-
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system has revolutionized financial markets by liberating them
from temporal and geographic constraints. For the first time,
market participants can trade financial instruments globally on
a 24-hour basis.5
Global trading creates unique business opportunities for
market participants, 6 particularly those operating in multiple ju-
risdictions.7 It also poses a novel and difficult multi-jurisdic-
tional tax allocation/intercompany pricing problem. Each time
ment deficit and 1984 legislation that allowed foreign investors to buy govern-
ment securities tax-free. Scott McMurray et al., Endless Dealing: U.S.
Treasury Debt Is Increasingly Traded Globally and Nonstop, WALL ST. J., Sept.
10, 1986, at Al. In 1986, the average daily volume in U.S. Treasury securities
trade was about $100 billion. Id. On the other hand, the global equity market is
traditionally the smallest global market. Debs, Globalization, supra note 2, at
200. According to Solomon Brothers, however, cross-border equity holdings
now amount to more than $600 billion. Claire Makin, How to Manage a Global
Money Manager, INSTITUTIONAL INvESTOR, Apr. 1990, at 69.
5. Commentators have identified numerous factors which contributed to
the rise of global trading in the 1980s. Five of the most prominent factors are:
(1) the advancement in information technology - especially in the telecommu-
nications and computer industries; (2) the development of a global economy
dominated by multinational corporations; (3) international capital imbalances,
particularly the United States' federal debt service requirements and Japan's
investment needs; (4) the emergence of huge institutional investment funds
whose investment needs require cross-national diversification; and (5) regula-
tory changes in many foreign stock exchanges that for the first time open those
exchanges to foreign memberships. For a full discussion of those factors, see
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TRADING AROUND THE
CLOCK: GLOBAL SECUrrIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY -
BACKGROUND PAPER (July 1990).
6. The term "market participants" as used in this article refers to finan-
cial intermediaries who trade globally. They are primarily commercial and in-
vestment banks as well as securities dealers. Plambeck, Taxation Implications,
supra note 3, at 1143-44.
Global trading creates business opportunities for three different groups of
market participants: capital users, capital suppliers, and financial in-
termediaries. Id. at 1145-46. Under the global system, users of capital (e.g., cor-
porate borrowers) can raise capital in a more efficient manner. Differences in
interest rates between countries can be exploited and newly issued financial
instruments can be marketed and traded simultaneously to a much larger pool
of potential investors in different countries. On the other hand, capital suppli-
ers also benefit. They now have access to investment opportunities in virtually
the entire industrialized world and thereby have more options when creating
their global portfolio. By diversifying their investment in multiple countries,
investors can reduce their exposure to regional political or natural risks associ-
ated with specific geographic areas. Moreover, brokers or dealers benefit from
the extreme spontaneity and fluidity the global system provides.
7. Jurisdiction in this Note refers to tax jurisdiction of a sovereign
country.
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a company engages in a related-party" cross-border transaction,
a transfer price must be determined for tax allocation purposes.9
Corporate taxpayers usually make such determinations but they
may be challenged by the Internal Revenue Service 1 during an
audit. In the United States, transfer price determinations are
primarily governed by applying section 482 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (I.R.C.) and the Treasury regulations promulgated
thereunder." They require the use of the arm's length standard
(the price which an uncontrolled taxpayer is willing to pay when
dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer).' 2
Global trading, however, is based on different economic assump-
tions than traditional domestic business transactions.'3 Recog-
8. An example of a related party transaction is a U.S. taxpayer which sells
to a foreign parent, foreign subsidiary, or other foreign related entity.
9. A transfer price is the price at which one business entity transfers a
certain product (e.g., tangibles, intangibles, services, loans) to a related party in
a different tax jurisdiction. Because different tax jurisdictions usually have dif-
ferent tax rates, a taxpayer who manipulates the transfer price can cause the
bulk of the profits to be taxed in the jurisdiction with the lower rate and
thereby reduce the total tax for the global enterprise. For example, assume
that the U.S. tax rate is 30% and the British tax rate is 60%. A U.S. parent
corporation manufactures widgets at $10 per unit. It then sells widgets both to
its related British sales subsidiary and to an unrelated British company. Both
British companies in turn resell the widgets for $20 per unit. The global enter-
prise would like to sell the widgets to the British subsidiary at $19. This allows
$9 of profit on each unit to be realized in the United States and taxed at the
lower U.S. rate (30%) and only $1 to be realized and taxed at the higher British
rate (60%).
10. Hereinafter the Service.
11. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations and references are to the
Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). All references to Treasury regulations are to in-
come tax regulations issued by the U.S. Treasury Department. All citations to
the § 482 regulations refer to the regulations as promulgated in 1968 and 1969.
T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218; T.D. 6998, 1969-1 C.B. 144.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968). For a discussion of the arm's length
standard, see infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text. The current Treasury
regulations under § 482, as they were promulgated in 1968 and 1969, rejected
the formula apportionment approach and preserved the arms length principle
originally adopted in the 1934 regulations. Harlow N. Higinbotham et al., Effec-
tive Application of the Section 482 Transfer Pricing Regulations, 42 TAX L.
REv. 295, 330 (1987). "Uncontrolled taxpayers" are basically unrelated third
parties. This contrasts with "controlled taxpayers" or "related parties" which
refer to a U.S. taxpayer which controls a foreign subsidiary, is controlled by a
foreign parent, or is related to other foreign parties.
13. Global trading repudiates many economic assumptions which govern
traditional business transactions and on which the arm's length standard is
based. Those rejected assumptions include the assumptions of integrity of dis-
tinct legal entities and the relevance of national boundaries to capital markets.
Charles Plambeck, Taxation Implications of Global Trading: A Summary, 14
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 364 (1991).
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nizing the need to promulgate tax guidelines for the fast-
developing and increasingly revenue-rich area of global trad-
ing,14 the Service has officially requested interested parties to
submit opinions and recommendations on the appropriate tax
treatment of global transactions.' 5 It is currently examining the
entire global trading arena with the objective of formulating reg-
ulatory or statutory amendments.18
This Note examines the applicability of the current transfer
pricing regime under section 482 to global trading. This Note
concludes that the existing system based on the arm's length
standard is inadequate, and proposes a new system for governing
the global trading area.
Part I provides a background discussion of global trading of
financial instruments, traditional income allocation standards
under section 482, and the Service's recent attempt to resolve
transfer pricing disputes by using administrative agreements
governed by the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) procedures.
Part II discusses the problems encountered under the cur-
rent transfer pricing system. It posits that the arm's length stan-
dard is inadequate to deal with certain models of global trading
such as the global 24-hour trading model. Part II further exam-
14. Global trading is fast becoming a very profitable business. In 1988, pre-
tax profits for eight money center banks from global trading were in the $2
billion range. Nigel A.L. Brooks, Global Trading; This High-Stakes Game De-
mands Technological Savvy, MAG. OF BANK ADMIN., Sept. 1989, at 36.
15. In Announcement 90-106, 1990-38 I.RB. 29 (1990), the Service re-
quested comments on issues raised by global trading of financial instruments.
Many major institutions and interested parties have submitted comments dis-
cussing various tax issues involved in global trading. Among the responses are
comments from Edward O'Brien, President of the Securities Industry Associa-
tion (SIA) (representing the view of the securities industry), comments by the
accounting firm of Ernst & Young for the Institute of International Bankers
(IIB) (representing the view of the international banks), and comments pre-
pared by the accounting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick (representing the views
of their foreign financial clients). For a reprint of these reports, see Securities
Association Offers Guidelines on Rules for Taxing Global Trading of Financial
Instruments, Jan. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI file, 91
TNI 3-40 [hereinafter SIA Report]; Ernst & Young, Tax Implications of Cross-
Border Trading by International Banks, May 15, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNI file, 91 TNI 20-27 [hereinafter Ernst & Young Report]; Peat
Marwick Clients Comment on Global Trading of Financial Instruments and
Potential Regulations, May 29,1991, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNI
file, 91 TNI 22-19 [hereinafter Peat Marwick Report].
16. The Service plans to alleviate this problem by statutory amendments or
regulatory examples under §§ 482 and 864 and/or other relevant code sections.
Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at '8. (Ed.'s note: for the purpose of this
Note, the asterisk-numbers refer to the screen number in LEXIS; the paren-
thetical section numbers refer to the actual report section numbers).
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ines two alternative methods for calculating transfer pricing:
the mark-to-market method 7 and the formula apportionment
method.' 8 This section concludes that the formula apportion-
ment method should be the substantive transfer pricing method
and that it should be governed by APA procedures. Finally, this
Note recommends the adoption by Congress of an integrated
system which involves both a default and an opt-out method. In-
itially, taxpayers would be required to use the formula appor-
tionment method as the default allocation method. If taxpayers
found this method did not accurately reflect their economic cir-
cumstances, they would be allowed to opt out of the default
method by entering into an administrative agreement with the
Service. The theory behind this dual method system is that indi-
vidually tailored administrative agreements usually best reflect
economic reality and, therefore, should be preferred. Taxpayers
who did not find this approach cost-effective 19 or who were ar-
ranging an administrative agreement would use the formula ap-
portionment method.
I. BACKGROUND
This Background introduces three major issues underlying
the United States taxation of global trading. First, the concept
of global trading and the three methods used to conduct it -
global twenty-four-hour trading, centralized product manage-
ment and separate entities coordinated by a head office - are
reviewed. Second, I.R.C. § 482, which governs transfer pricing
issues, is analyzed with particular attention given to its applica-
bility to global trading. A discussion of the administrative Ad-
vance Pricing Agreement (APA) procedure concludes this
section.
17. The mark-to-market method measures the daily profits or losses of an
entity by calculating the difference in value of the global portfolio between the
time it passes into and out of the jurisdiction.
18. The formula apportionment method apportions profits between tax ju-
risdictions according to a predetermined formula. Some commentators have
often discussed this method as a close contender behind the arm's length stan-
dard, but the Treasury Department has never seriously considered it.
19. Taxpayers may not find the APA method cost effective for various rea-
sons, one of which is that they only have minimal global involvement. The
scale of their global trading activity, therefore, may not justify engaging in such
negotiation.
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A. WHAT IS GLOBAL TRADING?
"Global trading," also called "twenty-four-hour trading,"' 2
refers to a financial market participant's ability to "execute cus-
tomer orders and to take proprietary positions in financial prod-
ucts in markets around the world and around the clock."' 21 A
company can structure and conduct its global trading activities
in one of the following three ways:22 (1) global twenty-four-
hour trading;23 (2) centralized product management;24 or (3) sep-
arate entities coordinated by a head office.25
From a theoretical standpoint, twenty-four-hour trading is
the ultimate in market globalization. Products traded under this
method are typically quite volatile and are actively traded in dif-
ferent jurisdictions around the clock.26 A company using such a
system maintains inventories of its financial products in differ-
ent countries. Typically, a company keeps multiple sets of in-
ventories, one in each of its key trading jurisdictions.27
Although the inventories are physically dispersed, only one ju-
risdiction owns and controls all global inventories and can make
centralized trading decisions at any particular time. Thus, the
20. The two definitions refer to the same economic activity but focus on
two distinct dimensions. "Global trading" refers to the geographic aspect of this
type of trading and its ability to transcend national barriers. "twenty-four-hour
trading," however, refers to the time dimension of the trade and its ability to
transcend time barriers. This Note categorizes all such trading activity as
"global trading."
21. Plambeck, Taxation Implications, supra note 3, at 1143-44.
22. For a discussion of the three separate trading models mentioned here,
see Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at '26-'32 (§ II.D.1-4); Peat Marwick
Report, supra note 15, at "15-'17, "25-'28 (§ II.B.1-3, III.D).
23. Global twenty-four-hour trading is also sometimes called the "sequen-
tial trading model." For a discussion of global twenty-hour trading, see Ernst &
Young Report, supra note 15, at "26-'27 (§ II.D.2); Peat Marwick Report, supra
note 15, at "16-'17, *28 (§§ II.B.3., III.D.).
24. Centralized product management is also sometimes called the "single
inventory model." For a discussion of centralized product management, see
Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "27-'30 (§ II.D.3); Peat Marwick Report,
supra note 15, at '16, '26-'28 (§ III.D).
25. The separate entities with head office coordination model is sometimes
called the "multiple inventories model." For a discussion of separate entities
with head office coordination, see Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at '31-
"32 (§ II.D.4); Peat Marwick Report, supra note 15, at '15, '25-'28 (§ II.B.1, II.D).
26. An example of such a product is foreign currency options. Peat
Marwick Repor4 supra note 15, at '29 (§ III.D).
27. For most international financial traders, the three key trading jurisdic-
tions are New York, London and Tokyo, which are also the three major world
trading centers for financial products. COOPERS & LYBRAND, EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY TO OPPORTUNITIES AND RISK IN THE 24-Hour GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 8
(1987).
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single trading authority is said to own the trading "book" or
portfolio.
Under this system, a company continuously transfers the
authority to trade the entire global portfolio between trading
centers located in different time zones.28 Companies that use
this system usually operate as a global team29 where employees
engaged in trading activities are located in multiple jurisdic-
tions.30 A team member in a particular region can trade the
global portfolio regardless of where the individual product is
physically located. This system, however, has been attempted in
only a few instances, mainly in the foreign exchange area. 31
The second global trading model - the centralized product
management method - uses multiple business units which are
not fully integrated, but rather are coordinated by a central
management office. An individual in a specified location is pri-
marily responsible for a particular product. 32 Unlike the dis-
persed inventories characteristic of global twenty-four-hour
trading, inventories of companies practicing centralized manage-
ment are primarily located in the "natural home" or primary
trading market of the product. 33 A global product manager pro-
28. For example, a global trader might keep its entire U.S. stock portfolio
in New York. When the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is open, all global
trading activities are conducted in New York. When the NYSE closes, the au-
thority to trade (or the "book") will be passed from New York to the company's
Tokyo office, which will then trade the U.S. stock portfolio on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. When the Tokyo Stock Exchange closes, the book will eventually
pass to London. The London office will then assume the authority to trade the
portfolio on the London Stock Exchange and will pass the book back to the
New York office. See generally Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "26-'27
(§ II.D.2).
29. A global team usually consists of managers, traders, the sales force and
a support group. See generally Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "35-*37
(§ II.E.1).
30. Peat Marwick Report, supra note 15, at 28 (§ III.D).
31. For example, two U.S. banks (Chemical Bank and Citibank) have their
Japanese branches engage in global twenty-four-hour foreign exchange trading.
NIKKEI FINANCIAL DAILY, Jan. 29, 1992, at 1, cited in COMLINE DAILY NEWS
ToKYo FNANCIAL WIRE, Jan. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File.
A new twenty-four-hour global trading system named Globex started June
24, 1992. Globex was started as a partnership between Reuters PLC, the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade to facilitate twenty-
four-hour trading in commodity futures contracts. The partners believe, how-
ever, that it could take up to two years before the system is successful. See
William B. Crawford, Jr., GLOBEX Trading Network Ready for Takeoff, CHI.
TRIB., June 21, 1992, § 7, at 1.
32. Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "30 (§ II.D.3).
33. The natural home of a product is where the product is primarily traded.
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vides regional book managers with instructions and limits for
carrying out the primary trading responsibilities for regional in-
ventories. When the primary market closes, traders in other
time zones assume these delegated tasks.s4
The third trading model - separate entities coordinated by
a head office - involves multiple local entities that operate au-
tonomouslys 5 Under this trading model, companies maintain
inventories of financial products at independent operating units
around the world. This model is usually used by trading opera-
tions that involve products with broad appeal that are actively
traded in a number of jurisdictionsse Unlike products traded in
the centralized product management model, products traded in
this model usually do not have one clear "natural home" but are
traded widely in numerous jurisdictions. Unlike products
traded by a unified trading authority which passes from one ju-
risdiction to another around the clock under the global twenty-
four-hour model, products under this model are traded by nu-
merous individual units which are geographically dispersed.
Under this model, every region is an independent operating unit
with minimal coordinated management of portfolios. Regional
offices are usually only restricted by broad credit limitations and
other prudential concerns imposed by the head office. Each of-
fice, therefore, is a profit center with wide managerial and in-
vestment decision power.37
For example, New York is the natural home for U.S. Treasury securities. Peat
Marwick Report, supra note 15, at "11 (§ III.(d), Organization of Trading
Operations).
34. For example, a company using the centralized product management
method of trading that keeps its inventory in the United States would pass the
"book" to its Tokyo trader who would trade the U.S. portfolio after the primary
market (New York) closes. If the portfolio was bought at $10.00 in New York
and sold at $12.00 in Tokyo, the $2 "profit" must first be reduced by allocated
expenses, then apportioned between the two tax jurisdictions - in this case, the
United States and Japan.
35. Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at '31 (§ II.D.4).
36. An example is the trading of foreign currencies and derivative products
like interest rate swaps. Peat Marwick Report, supra note 15, at "17-*18
(§ III.A.).
37. Under this system, for example, New York, London and Tokyo would
each have their own separate inventory and portfolio of U.S. stocks. They
would then trade independently and be subject to minimal coordination. Two
dangers of this strategy are that the lack of coordination might lead to dupli-
cated efforts or that two centers might use totally opposite trading strategies.
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B. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAw DEALING WITH TRANSFER PRICING:
I.R.C. SECTION 482
Whenever a company engages in an intercompany or related
party transaction which involves more than one tax jurisdiction,
it must allocate its global profits among those jurisdictions.3 s
The company must also account for its transfers under in-
tercompany pricing rules so that each jurisdiction can tax its
share while avoiding double taxation.39 Because global traders
engage in cross-border transactions, the tax consequences of
their actions are directly governed by the allocation method
employed.
Under the U.S. tax regime, transfer pricing rules between
related entities are governed primarily by § 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code and its accompanying regulations. Section 482
authorizes the Service to modify the distribution of tax obliga-
tions between related taxpayers if the Service determines that,
as a result of transactions between those related entities, an allo-
cation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect in-
come clearly.4° Although § 482 was originally written as an
accounting rule,4 1 it is now also widely used as the prime author-
ity governing transfer pricing for cross-border, related party
transactions. 42 The Treasury regulations promulgated under
38. Under general tax principals, income earned through efforts in more
than one tax jurisdiction should be apportioned between those jurisdictions so
that each can tax its allocable share.
39. For a basic discussion of income allocation and transfer pricing, see D.
Kevin Dolan, Intercompany Transfer Pricing for the Layman, 49 TAX NOTES
211 (1990).
40. I.R.C. § 482 states that:
In any case of two or more organizations ... owned or controlled di-
rectly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances
between or among such organizations ... if he determines that such
distribution... is necessary in order.., clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations.
41. The legislative history of the predecessor of § 482 (§ 45 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939) indicates that the purpose was "to prevent evasion (by
the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods fre-
quently adopted for the purpose of 'milking')." H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16-17 (1928). It is also used to prevent corporations from "juggping] trans-
actions and tak[ing] advantage of questionable sales to each other to get deduc-
tions." 69 CONG. REc. 605 (1928). The current approach, however, applies § 482
even in instances where no intention of tax evasion exists. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(c). See generally Higinbotham et al., supra note 12, at 300.
42. In the international tax context, § 482 is now used primarily to allow
the I.R.S. to second-guess taxpayers' "transfer price" determinations in order to
ensure that they "clearly" reflect income. Dolan, supra note 39, at 214.
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§ 482 provide technical rules which apportion income based on
the arm's length principle.4s This principle posits that the ap-
propriate transfer price (the "arm's length price") of a transac-
tion between two related parties is the price that would have
been agreed upon if the two parties were not related or
"controlled.""
A taxpayer applying the arm's length standard to a business
transaction first must characterize the transaction according to
one of the following regulatory categories: 1) loans or ad-
vances;45 2) performance of services for another;46 3) use of tan-
gible property;47 4) transfer or use of intangible property;48 or
5) sales of tangible property.49 The taxpayer then applies the
arm's length standard to determine the transfer price of transac-
tions which fall under the appropriate category. Of the five par-
adigms, performance of services and the sale of tangible
property are the two categories most relevant to global trading.
(1) The Separate Entities Coordinated by Head Office Model
The separate entities coordinated by head office model con-
tains local profit centers which operate independently. Each lo-
cal entity engages in regular sales and purchases of financial
products at an arm's length market price like an unaffiliated in-
dependent operating unit. The prices can be easily determined
by reference to similar unrelated trades with third parties in the
home jurisdiction. Because such transactions are more akin to a
43. Nearly all countries currently use the arm's length standard to estab-
lish transfer price between related parties for income allocation. Britain,
France, Germany, the United States and Japan, among other industrialized
countries, have adopted the arm's length standard for international tax appor-
tionment. Furthermore, this standard was specifically endorsed by the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the preferred
universal standard. OECD, Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and
on Capital, art. 9(1) (1977); OECD, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL EN-
TERPRISES, 3, 37 (1979). See also Higinbotham et al., supra note 12, at 302
("Most developed countries and most tax treaties have adopted the arm's length
principle for testing intercompany transfer prices, consistent with the section
482 regulations.").
44. Dolan, supra note 39, at 214. For example, in the sales of tangible prop-
erty context, the arm's length price is defined as "the price that an unrelated
party would have paid under the same circumstances for the property involved
in the controlled sale." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(i).
45. Id. § 1.482-2(a).
46. Id. § 1.482-2(b).
47. Id. § 1.482-2(c).
48. Id. § 1.482-2(d).
49. Id. § 1.482-2(e).
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sales transaction than a service transaction, their tax treatment
should be governed by the sale of tangible property paradigm.
In general, the sale of inventory or tangible property para-
digm requires the taxpayer to find the arm's length price by
comparing it to a similar uncontrolled transaction.5 ° One of the
following three regulatory methods for finding the arm's length
price should be used:51 (1) the similar uncontrolled price
method,5 2 (2) the resale price method,53 or (3) the cost-plus
method.54 For most financial products or heavily traded com-
modities, the comparable uncontrolled price method is used be-
cause those products invariably have an established and active
market which makes it extremely easy to find comparable trans-
actions.5 5 An arm's length price can be established by compar-
ing it to the market price, which is also the uncontrolled price.56
In this context, the use of the arm's length standard is justified
because the separate entities already operate in such an autono-
mous fashion that using market price as the determining price
accurately reflects economic reality.
50. The availability of a comparable transaction is the key to using the
arm's length standard successfully. Various types of arm's length standards all
require the existence of a comparable uncontrolled transaction.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1)(ii). If none of the three methods apply be-
cause there is no comparable uncontrolled transaction, the regulations permit
some kind of "fourth" method to be used. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii). Which meth-
ods the Service will accept as the "fourth" method, however, has not yet been
statutorily determined. This uncertainty results in frequent litigation.
52. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(2). The comparable uncontrolled price method applies
if there are comparable uncontrolled sales of the same or similar products by
either the taxpayer or a competitor. If such comparable sales exist, this method
must be used. This method is used very frequently in the securities and similar
markets where market prices exist for the product.
53. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(3). The resale price method is especially useful when
determining an appropriate mark-up for distributors selling products manufac-
tured by related parties. Using this method, the taxpayer identifies the resale
margin of unrelated distributors which sell the same or similar products and
perform similar functions. The arm's length price then reflects the unrelated
resale margin.
54. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(4). The cost-plus method is typically used when a man-
ufacturer sells products to a related distributor. To establish the arm's length
price, the manufacturer will try to identify other unrelated manufacturers that
use cost-plus mark-ups, perform similar manufacturing functions and assume
similar risks.
55. Most frequently, publicly traded financial products have one or more
established markets. For example, most publicly traded stocks, bonds and
other securities are listed on exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange, the
London Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Prices for any listed
stock are continuously available to the public. Most commodities, like oil, gold
and silver have their own markets, making prices readily available.
56. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e).
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(2) The Centralized Product Management Model
The arm's length standard for sales should not be applied to
the second type of global trading, the centralized product man-
agement model. Under this model, all traders are located in one
tax jurisdiction 7 but salespeople are employed globally in multi-
ple foreign jurisdictions.m The salespeople market the financial
products and solicit business from customers, whereas traders
provide the price for each transaction and actually close each
trade.5 9 Because the salespeople perform a sales service rather
than transact a sale, this economic activity should more properly
be characterized as the performance of a service, rather than a
sale of goods transaction. Thus, the compensation for services
paradigm rather than the sale of tangible property paradigm
should determine the calculation of the arm's length price.60 As
contrasted with the separate entities with head office coordina-
tion method, the centralized product management method fo-
cuses on services rather than sales.
The compensation for services paradigm provides that a tax-
payer must generally compensate a member of a controlled
group who performs services for another controlled group mem-
ber. If no charge or a non-arm's length charge is paid, the Ser-
vice can make an allocation to reflect the arm's length
transaction.61 This paradigm would, for example, require a for-
eign agent to charge an arm's length fee for a transaction exe-
cuted for its U.S. parent corporation rather than allowing the
execution of the trade free of charge.
The regulations require the use of a "benefits test" to deter-
mine the allocation or amount that should be charged for the
intercompany service.62 Under this test, the allocation must cor-
respond to the relative benefits the provider intends to confer,
based upon the facts known at the time the services are con-
57. Tax jurisdiction, in this Note, has the same meaning as trading
jurisdiction.
58. In a typical global securities trading setting, four types of personnel are
usually involved in a transaction. They are the managers, the traders, the sales
force and the support group. The managers or market strategists identify the
economic trends, design and implement strategies and manage the traders and
sales forces. The traders establish positions, make hedging decisions and create
markets. The sales force executes customers' orders; and the support group
gathers, summarizes and dispenses information and provides technology to all
functions. Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "21-'23 (§ II.C.1).
59. Peat Marwick Report, supra note 15, at "16 (§ II.B.2).
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b); Id. § 1.482-2(e).
61. Id. § 1.482-2(b)(1).
62. The benefits test is set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(2).
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ferred.63 Actual benefits conferred are irrelevant.6 In deter-
mining the arm's length amount, the regulations lay out
different price determination methods for services which are in-
tegral versus non-integral parts of either the provider's or the
recipient's business.65 If the transaction is not an integral part of
either party's business, the entities can use the "cost or deduc-
tion" method. This method treats the arm's length price as
equal to the costs or deductions incurred with respect to the
services.6 However, entities must use the more stringent "com-
parable arm's length charge" standard, which requires a deter-
mination of an arm's length service charge, if the transaction is
an integral part of the business.67 In the global trading context,
because the integral part of a financial intermediary's business is
rendering financial services, such services are usually considered
an integral part of the business of both the renderer and recipi-
ent. That is, both the renderer and recipient are either a broker
or trader. Therefore, both entities must use the "comparable
arm's length charge."
The arm's length standard might be difficult to apply in this
instance because it is difficult to find a comparable arm's length
charge. Unlike sales of securities (goods) which have an easily
determinable market price, compensation structures between
different financial intermediaries can vary greatly. In such
cases, comparable uncontrolled services may not exist. Even if
the traders have similar compensation structures, the Service
may argue, for example, that the difference in trading volume or
services performed renders prices incomparable.68 Also, service
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(2)(i).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 1.482-2(b)(3). "Integral part" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2(b)(7)(i), which provides that "[s]ervices are an integral part of the business
activity of a member of a controlled group where either the renderer or the
recipient is engaged in the trade or business of rendering similar services to one
or more unrelated parties."
66. Id. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
67. The regulations define an arm's length charge as "the amount which
was charged or would have been charged for the same or similar services in
independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar cir-
cumstances considering all relevant facts." Id. § 1.482-2(b)(3).
68. A similar argument has been made by the Service in U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1977), rev'd and modifted, 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1980). In that case, a U.S. parent corporation owned a foreign subsidiary that
was in the shipping business. The subsidiary shipped iron ore for both the par-
ent corporation and independent third parties, charging both the same price.
The parent corporation considered the independent third parties' sale an in-
dependent uncontrolled sale, qualifying the third party sale price as the arm's
length price. The Service rejected this argument, arguing that in light of the
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transactions are much more difficult to quantify than tangible
properties transactions.
Another problem in applying the arm's length standard
here is its disregard for the synergies inherent in a multinational
enterprise.8 9 Because arm's length pricing results in charging a
related corporation and a third party the same price, it fails to
take into consideration the significant "economies of integra-
tion" or cost savings that a controlled group can achieve using
controlled sales. 70 By forcing related parties to account for those
sales by using the arm's length standard, the regulations essen-
tially deprive the parties of the unique benefits derived from in-
tegration. In the global trading context, the elimination of third
party agents or brokers is one such benefit.71 This method,
therefore, usually does not reflect economic reality.72
unique relationship between the parent and the subsidiary and given the vol-
ume of ore the parent corporation shipped, the sales of the independent third
parties and the controlled sale to the parent were not comparable. The Tax
Court agreed. The Second Circuit reversed, however, asserting that a contrary
holding would "allow the taxpayer no safe harbor from the Commissioner's vir-
tually unrestricted discretion to reallocate." 617 F.2d at 951-52. This case dem-
onstrates the difficulty in applying the inherently subjective arm's length
standard and the "unreasonable" positions which the Service may take. It also
indicates that even if uncontrolled transactions exist, the Service has allowed
application of that method only under circumstances in which the transactions
are nearly identical, with very strict comparability requirements. Therefore,
unless the Service changes its position, the Service will likely reject the use of
the comparable arm's length price if there is a substantial difference in volume
between the related party and unrelated customers.
69. See, e.g., Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of
Arm's Length, 30 TAx NoTES 625 (1986). (Langbein argues for the application of
the formula apportionment method in place of the arm's length standard).
70. For a discussion of the failure of the arm's length standard to take into
consideration economies of scale by integration, see Higinbotham et al., supra
note 12, at 330-35.
71. The elimination of third party brokers and agents can be a huge cost
saving to global traders. By doing all transactions in-house, brokerage expenses
are cut down. This benefit would not be reflected correctly if taxpayers are
required to treat such transaction for tax purposes as an arm's length
transaction.
72. See generally Higinbotham et al., supra note 12, at 332 (citing Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (new Series) 386 (1937); Oliver F. Wil-
liamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Rela-
tions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979)). The authors posit that when business
enterprises engage in intercompany transactions for goods or services, they are
motivated at least in part by favorable costs or other economic benefits of the
normally cheaper internal source of supply as compared to the external sources.
Because this motivation to capture the cost savings is a significant incentive for
companies to vertically integrate, a method that forces the taxpayer to report
those transactions under the arm's length method would artificially distort eco-
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(3) The Global Twenty-Four-Hour Trading Model
Traders following the global twenty-four-hour trading
model are located in several tax jurisdictions and trade from a
common inventory. The authority to trade the inventory contin-
uously passes from one jurisdiction to another concurrent with
the local market trading hours. Each trader in the system has
the power to quote prices and conclude contracts with
customers.
73
The arm's length standard is also an inadequate method of
taxation for these kinds of transactions. The Code and the ac-
companying regulations do not provide a proper means of appor-
tioning income among jurisdictions under this method. Neither
the performance of services paradigm nor the sale of inventory
paradigm is sufficient for this new type of transaction. By its
nature, global twenty-four-hour trading defies national bounda-
ries, and can easily be double taxed under this method, as illus-
trated below.
Suppose a trader in a global financial trading company's
London office buys 100 shares of Company A's stock for US $90
per share. At the end of the trading session, she passes the
shares on to the New York office, which sells them for $100 per
share. The trading company's gross profit is $10 per share. Brit-
ish tax authorities may argue that the London office identified
the valuable stock, and the value of the later sale thus belongs in
London and is subject to British tax. U.S. tax authorities may
contend that the sale in New York produced the profit, and the
value thus belongs in New York (and is subject to U.S. tax).74
Because both arguments have some merit, double taxation may
not be avoidable without some kind of improved international
taxation method.75
nomic reality. It would also reduce the benefit the taxpayer can enjoy from
integration. Higinbotham et al., supra note 12, at 332.
73. Peat Marwick Report, supra note 15, at "17 (§ II.B.2).
74. Martin, IRS Sees Tax Troubles in Global Trading, XXII:35 WALL ST.
LETTER, Sept. 3, 1990, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT file.
75. As a tax specialist aptly put it, "It is a real problem when you have
people from all over creating a pool of income and then you try to split up the
pie.... What threatens to happen is Uncle Sam eats 33% and Mrs. Thatcher
takes around 35% ... and obviously the business quickly becomes unprofitable."
1d.
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C. AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATION PROCESS: THE ADVANCE PRICING
AGREEMENT (APA)
After a taxpayer has determined a method to use and has
applied it accordingly, it may be accepted or contested by the
Service. Before 1991, transfer pricing questions only arose on an
ex post facto basis when the Service audited a taxpayer's return
and disagreed with the transfer price used by the taxpayer. The
Service would then propose an adjustment to the taxpayer's tax
liability. If the taxpaying entity disagreed with the adjustment,
it could seek administrative or judicial remedies through
lengthy appeals conferences or litigation.76
Realizing the inconvenience of this process, the Service im-
plemented a major procedural change in 1991. In Revenue Pro-
cedure 91-22, 77 the Service promulgated a series of steps through
which taxpayers could approach the Service for advance consid-
eration of their "transfer pricing methodologies" (TPMs).78
Under the new procedures, rather than engage in ex post facto
examinations, the Service contracts with a taxpayer and enters
into a mutually agreed upon transfer price methodology prior to
the consummation of the business transaction. This Advance
Pricing Agreement (APA) between the taxpayer and the Ser-
vice protects the taxpayer's allocation methodology from chal-
lenges in subsequent audits.79 Reaching a transfer price through
the APA procedure thus spares participants the costs involved
in the traditional approach which may include ex post facto audit
discussions, appeals conferences and litigation.
In general, the APA procedure attempts to produce an un-
derstanding between the taxpayer, the Service and, if necessary,
other third parties8 0 on: (1) an appropriate transfer pricing
methodology; (2) the factual nature of the transaction involved;
76. It is not uncommon for such litigation to last for several years.
77. Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991 C.B. 526.
78. Transfer Pricing Methodologies (TPMs) are methods which a taxpayer
uses to price its intercompany transfers. The Revenue Procedure contemplates
that the TPM be consistent with the arm's length standard, supported by avail-
able and reliable data, and efficiently administrable. The Revenue Procedure
also envisions that the TPM should produce, with as little adjustment as possi-
ble, an anticipated range of arm's length prices that clearly reflects income. Id.
§ 3.02.
79. For a discussion of the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA), see Joseph
L. Andrus et al., The New Section 482 Advance Pricing Agreement Procedure:
Overview and Analysis, 51 TAx NOTEs 353 (1991).
80. Third parties usually include foreign countries' tax authorities. Be-
cause transfer pricing is inevitably a multi-jurisdictional issue, it is important
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and, if appropriate, (3) the expected result of the transfer pricing
methodology.8 ' To obtain an APA, a taxpayer first proposes a
transfer pricing methodology and provides data showing that it
will produce arm's length results for the particular intercom-
pany transaction between the taxpayer and the specified affili-
ates.8 2 The Service then evaluates the APA request by
analyzing the data submitted and any other relevant informa-
tion. 3 If the request is approved and the APA is executed, it
becomes a binding contract between the taxpayer and the Ser-
vice.84 As long as a taxpayer complies with the terms and condi-
tions of the APA, applying the TPM satisfies the arm's length
standard requirement under § 4 8 2 .85 Wide use of this method
may resolve transfer pricing problems in a more efficient and
inexpensive manner, in part because of reduced litigation
costs.86 So far, this method has been well received and has been
used with increasing frequency.8
7
for affected taxpayers to bind all relevant tax authorities to the apportionment
agreement so that they can avoid double taxation.
81. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 77, § 3.03.
82. Id. § 2.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 9.01 ("An APA is a binding agreement between the taxpayer and
the Service"). By entering into a binding agreement with the Service, the tax-
payer is assured that as long as the terms of the agreement were complied with
and as long as there was no change in a critical assumption underlying the
agreement, the transfer pricing methodology approved in the APA will be up-
held in subsequent audits. Id
85. Id. §§ 9.01, 9.02.
86. It is administratively easier and cheaper to negotiate an agreement
with the Service to cover a future transaction than to settle a pricing dispute on
a ex post facto basis. Not only can the taxpayer avoid the expensive and lengthy
audit, appeal, and possible litigation, it can also plan its transaction with a much
higher degree of certainty. The experience of Apple Computer provides a good
example. Apple entered an APA with the Service concerning the sale of its
products to an Australian distribution subsidiary. The Director of Taxes for
Apple stated that Apple applied for the APA and settled the whole transfer
price issue by submitting three binders of information. If the case had taken
the traditional ex post facto approach and if Apple was audited, resulting in
litigation, the court information necessary for a trial would instead amount to
three boxcars. The APA procedure not only saved Apple a lot of hassle, but
also significant litigation expenses. Emily E. Eliot, Transfer Pricing: Apple
and GM Tax Chiefs Discuss Their Experiences in Obtaining Advance Pricing
Agreements, 3 TAx NOTEs INT'L 373 (1991) (comments of Eric D. Ryan, Director
of Taxes for Apple Computer).
87. The APA process has "moved from an experimental notion that is now
reaching maturity." International Taxes: Transfer Pricing Rules, Penalty Gui-
dance Top IRS International Guidance Priorities, 218 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA)
(Nov. 12, 1991), available in WESTLAW, BNA-TX database, WL 218 DER G-5,
1991. As of November 1991, the IRS had received about 30 active APA applica-
tions. In addition, treaty partners of the United States such as Germany, the
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Despite its many advantages, the APA in its current form
suffers from a number of shortcomings. There is a possibility
that it may not protect taxpayers' confidential trade secrets from
disclosure to third parties under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)."s The FOIA requires federal agencies to make
some agency records available to the public on request. Disclo-
sure can only be refused if it is determined that the information
sought is within one or more of the nine stated exemption cate-
gories, each of which identifies a class of information.8 9 In gen-
eral, tax return information is confidential and protected from
disclosure by section 6103 of the I.R.C.9° However, there are
doubts whether an APA and its supporting documentation con-
stitute tax return information. Therefore, it is possible that such
information might be discoverable by the public.9 ' If so, trade
secrets such as profit margin by product line, subsidiary or
branch and sensitive corporate data may become available to
competitors. This could reduce the attractiveness of the APA
procedure and make taxpayers reluctant to enter into such
agreements.
A second problem with the APA procedure is that data vol-
untarily disclosed to the Service might be used by the Service in
subsequent audits. Section 9.04 of the Revenue Procedure pro-
vides that:
[I]f the APA is not executed or if an executed APA is later revoked or
canceled, neither the APA or the proposal to use a particular TPM nor
any non-factual oral or written representations or submissions made
during the APA process may be introduced by the taxpayer or the Ser-
vice as an admission by the other party in any administrative or judicial
proceeding for the taxable years for which the APA was requested or
executed. 92
Although this provision protects the taxpayer from the Ser-
vice's use of non-factual data in subsequent controversies, it does
not prohibit the Service from using factual data against the tax-
payer. Confidential corporate material, once delivered to the
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and Australia have been receptive to the pro-
cess and have publicly expressed support for the program. Id. at "2-*3.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
89. Id. § 552(b)(1-9).
90. I.R.C. § 6103 (1988 & Supp. 1990). Section 6103(a) provides that "re-
turns and return information shall be confidential, and except as authorized ...
(1) no officer or employee of the United States... shall disclose any return or
return information obtained .. " Id.
91. For a discussion of the possible effect of the FOIA on the APA, see
Mike McIntyre, The Case for Public Disclosure of Advance Rulings on Transfer
Pricing Methodologies, 2 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1127 (1990).
92. Rev. Proc. 91-22, supra note 77, § 9.04.
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Service in connection with an APA request, could conceivably
be used freely by the Service in any subsequent controversy. 93
Thus, despite the benefits of the APA procedure, the significant
dangers which may be connected with such a request call for
administrative or legislative reassurance. APA information
should be recognized as tax return material in order to protect it
from disclosure. Moreover, the Service should be limited in its
ability to use this sensitive tax information, which has been vol-
untarily disclosed by the taxpayer.
II. ANALYSIS
The arm's length standard inadequately deals with the
global twenty-four-hour trading model and, to a lesser extent,
the centralized product management model of global trading.
Although the APA procedure can alleviate some of the
problems of the arm's length standard, the APA procedure itself
is also in need of much improvement. This section first discusses
why the arm's length standard is inadequate to deal with both
global twenty-four-hour trading and centralized product man-
agement. Next, it discusses why an alternative method, the
mark-to-market method, is also unworkable. Finally, a second
alternative, the formula apportionment method, is analyzed.
A. INADEQUACY OF THE ARM'S LENGTH STANDARD
Despite the limited benefits offered by the arm's length
standard in traditional international transactions, it is grossly in-
adequate when applied to the global trading area.94 The arm's
length standard has often been criticized as difficult to apply and
unjust.95 It poses three major problems. First, from the practi-
cal standpoint of compliance, it remains almost impossible to es-
tablish an arm's length price because reasonable people may
differ over the appropriate price for a particular transaction.96
93. Andrus et al., supra note 79, at 358.
94. Two often acclaimed benefits of the arm's length standard are its uni-
versal acceptance in the industrialized world and its purported ability to reflect
economic reality.
95. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 69, at 657-58; STAFF OF THE JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., PRESENT LAw AND CERTAIN IS-
SUES RELATING TO TRANSFER PRICING (CODE SECrION 482) 24 (Comm. Print
1990) (discussing criticism of the arm's length standard); Kathleen Matthews &
J.M. Turro, International Tax Policy in the 21st Century, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L
454, 456 (May 1990) (quoting Joint Committee on Taxation Chief of Staff for the
proposition that "the arm's length standard is not viable").
96. D. Kevin Dolan & Ronald Pearlman, Dolan, Pearlman Square Off over
Arms-Length v. Formula Apportionment, 50 TAX NOTES 1336 (1991).
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Determining a transfer price is a subjective factual judgment
that, in most situations, involves the exercise of a certain
amount of business judgment and discretion.9 The good faith
determination of a transfer price by a taxpayer may be very dif-
ferent from the price estimated by the Service's experts years
after the transaction. In fact, taxpayers sometimes may have no
incentive to set a correct price. The common perception is that
regardless of how hard the taxpayer tries to find the "correct
price," the Service may nevertheless challenge it. This encour-
ages taxpayers to honestly understate income by choosing the
lowest sustainable arm's length price, thereby promoting ad hoc
determinations in that grey area.98 This, in turn, undermines
the predictability that companies need when planning transac-
tions.9 For example, a global trader using the centralized prod-
97. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, when testi-
fying before the Ways and Means Committee's Hearing on International Com-
petitiveness on June 18, 1991, said that "[Tiransfer prices, by their very nature,
are synthetic. That is, they are statistical and accounting constructs . . . on
which people's judgements can reasonably differ." June 21, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file, 91 TNT 133-26 (Doc. 91-5234). See also U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1977), rev'd and modified, 617
F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
98. Taxpayers who are disappointed at the futility of trying to establish an
arm's length price might find determining the arm's length price a waste of
effort. Instead, the taxpayer might find it more advantageous to fix the transfer
price at the outer bound of the reasonable price range (either at the maximum
or the minimum reasonable price, depending on the differences in tax rates of
the two relevant jurisdictions) and let the Service make any adjustments from
that point. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., for example, once took the follow-
ing tax strategy, as revealed in a memorandum from its tax planning
department:
It would seem to be desirable to bill the tax haven subsidiary at less
than an 'arm's length' price because: (1) the pricing might not be chal-
lenged by the revenue agent; (2) if the pricing is challenged, we might
sustain such transfer prices; (3) if we cannot sustain the prices used, a
transfer price will be negotiated which should not be more than an
'arm's length' price and might well be less; thus we would be no worse
off than we would have been had we billed at the higher price.
Du Pont De Nemours v. United States, 608 F.2d 445, 447 n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
99. A company's ability to plan and estimate tax liability before it executes
a transaction is particularly important in the international tax area where taxes
totalling millions of dollars are often at stake. A taxpayer under the current
tax regime has no way of telling whether the Service will accept its good faith
transfer price determination. The Service will not need to decide to accept or
reject the taxpayer's determination usually until years after the transaction has
been completed when the Service audits the tax return. Because every retroac-
tive redetermination of transfer price involves a question of fact (whether the
price of a certain transaction is at arm's length), great uncertainty exists for the
taxpayers. This in turn undermines the business community's need for predict-
ability and finality. In the worst case scenario, it might even turn what was
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uct management model might have difficulty finding the arm's
length service charge for foreign sales representatives, an inte-
gral part of the parent corporation's operation.1°°
Furthermore, as discussed above, the ex post facto audit pro-
cedure breeds litigation and is very expensive for taxpayers.
Whether a taxpayer has set a transfer price at arm's length is a
factual question which can arise year after year when the tax-
payer resets the arm's length price.1 1 The arm's length stan-
dard, therefore, creates a tremendous burden on international
traders and places a noticeable strain on the court system.
Moreover, because the arm's length standard requires a
transaction-by-transaction analysis of arm's length price, its use
is very burdensome in the fluid, fast-moving field of global trad-
ing.102 In the centralized product management model, for exam-
ple, every one of the millions of transactions executed by the
foreign country agents each year would have to be analyzed indi-
vidually for their respective arm's length service charge. Infor-
mation must be gathered regarding numerous aspects of the
transactions. Although information concerning where, when,
and at what price the product was bought, sold, held and trans-
ferred between jurisdictions would be readily available, informa-
tion of an aggregate nature (e.g., cost of backroom activities,
trader compensation) is more difficult to allocate to individual
transactions. 0 3 With millions of transactions, the compliance
cost would be unrealistically high.
The two oft-cited advantages of the arm's length approach
are its universal acceptance and its ability to reflect economic
reality. Both advantages are illusory in the global trading con-
text. The arm's length approach is currently the universally ac-
cepted method of income allocation between countries.1°4
contemporaneously seen as a profitable deal into an after-tax loss, years after
the transaction was completed.
100. For a discussion of the centralized product management model, see
supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
101. The Service itself also recognizes the problem of using a straight arm's
length standard. As Charles Triplett, Deputy Associate Chief Counsel (Inter-
national) for international tax matters of the Service noted, "(T]here 'has to be
a better way' than having so many transfer pricing cases ending up in Tax
Court." Eliot, supra note 86, at 374.
102. Kathleen Matthews, U.S. Tax Authorities Grapple with Implications of
Global Capital Market Transactions, 2 TAx NOTES INT'L 217, 217-18, (1990).
103. The entities would need to keep good record of their support staffs,
incidental expenses and overhead expenses so that they could be allocated to
the different sales.
104. See supra note 43. Some commentators, however, have questioned
whether the arm's length standard's universal acceptance is attributable to its
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Proponents of the arm's length standard often argue that be-
cause discrepancies among different countries' allocation rules
would result in international double taxation, a universal stan-
dard should be used. 0 5 Even if all countries were to use the
arm's length standard, however, double taxation could still oc-
cur. Two countries both using the arm's length standard can
reach different arm's length prices. 1°6 This difference can cause
double taxation in an international arm's length regime.
Similarly, the arm's length standard does not reflect eco-
nomic reality in the global trading context. Although designed
to reflect the income and expense of transactions, the arm's
length approach actually ignores the fundamental theory of
economies of scale. Companies often enter into related-party
transactions and use either horizontal or vertical integration to
cut costs.107 If the arm's length standard is used, all related-
party transactions will have to be recalculated at arm's length.
This eliminates any cost savings from integration. Companies
often perform transactions with related brokers because they
can then pay a lower related-party fee. By forcing taxpayers to
artificially recalculate the cost at arm's length, the tax law
merits or to the United States' active lobbying and sponsorship. In the post-war
period, when the international community was searching for a universally ap-
plicable income allocation standard, the United States adopted the arm's length
approach via the § 482 regulations. Because the United States was the largest
global trader in the early post-war period, its active lobbying for the arm's
length standard in other countries might have been a significant factor which
contributed to its universal acceptance. See, e.g., Higinbotham et al., supra note
12, at 301 n.22.
105. For example, suppose country X adopts the arm's length standard and
country Y uses formula apportionment (the method that apportions income
based on one factor - workforce size). A corporation with all managerial per-
sonnel in X (e.g. 2% of its global work force) and all sales employees in Y (e.g.
98% of its global work force), engages in global trading between X and Y and
earns $100,000 in global profits. Country X may argue that because all the eco-
nomic risks are borne by the country X Parent Corp. with the country Y em-
ployees merely acting as its agent, the bulk of the income should be allocated to
country X. Country Y, however, might argue that since 98% of the employees
are in Y, 98% of the income should be allocated to Y. This discrepancy, if left
unresolved, will create international double taxation. Both countries X and Y
will tax the bulk of the income of the consolidated group.
106. Using a performance of services paradigm, suppose a parent corpora-
tion A buys securities for $20 and, at the end of the trading day, transfers them
abroad to its subsidiary B, which sells them for $100. Ignoring expenses, the net
profit between A and B is $80. Double taxation will result if the tax authority in
A's jurisdiction finds the arm's length prices to be $80 and taxes $60 of profit,
while the tax authority in B's jurisdiction finds the arm's length price to be $40
and also taxes $60 of profit.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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forces them to forgo such cost savings. Thus, the arm's length
standard ignores economic reality.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET METHOD
The mark-to-market method is a potential alternative to the
arm's length standard. It is founded on the theory that the daily
income of a jurisdiction is reflected by the difference in the
value of the global book between the time it passes into and out
of a jurisdiction. 0 8 However, because this method takes two ar-
bitrary points in time (the opening and closing of the market)
and considers any difference between the price of the two as
profit or loss, it does not reflect economic reality. This method
has been widely rejected as a suitable alternative to the arm's
length method.
The mark-to-market method requires the use of a two-step
process of computing trading profits. First, the global book's as-
sets and allocable liabilities are valued and calculated daily.
Under this method, the value of the book is marked to market
value at each passing. Whenever a portfolio enters or leaves the
market, its value is calculated at that time according to the cur-
rent market price. Second, the trader determines the net profits
of the jurisdiction by subtracting allocable expenses from the al-
located profits.1 ° 9 The profit attributable to a specific tax juris-
diction is the change in value of the book from the beginning to
the end of the trading day in that jurisdiction. n 0
For example a U.S. parent corporation (Parent Corpora-
tion) passes its trading book with a portfolio of 100,000 shares of
Company A common stock to its Tokyo trading office when the
New York Stock Exchange closes. When the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change opens, Company A common stock in Tokyo is trading at
US $99.50."' Later, when the Tokyo Stock Exchange closes,
Parent Corp. will pass the book to its London trading office. By
108. For a full discussion of the mark-to-market approach, see Plambeck,
Taxation Implications, supra note 3, at 1155. (dismissing the mark-to-market
approach as a viable alternative).
109. Major allocable expense items include commissions paid to salespeople,
compensation to management and fees to support groups. In the allocation pro-
cess, either the traditional arm's length realization approach or some kind of
formula apportionment method can be used.
110. This is the same as the difference in value between the time of receipt
of the book and the time of passing of the book. Plambeck, Taxation Implica-
tions, supra note 3, at 1155.
111. For simplicity, this illustration does not take into consideration the dif-
ferences between bid and ask prices. However, this factor should have little
impact on the analysis.
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closing time in Tokyo, Company A stock is trading at US $100.00.
Under the mark-to-market method, the Tokyo subsidiary would
have a $50,000 profit (($100.00 - $99.50) X 100,000). With allo-
cated expenses of $10,000, the net profit of the Tokyo office on
that day would be $40,000.
The mark-to-market approach is objective and simple to ap-
ply. Valuation can be determined easily because most of the fi-
nancial products involved have active and established markets.
This method, however, poorly reflects economic reality.
The mark-to-market approach ties the profit determination di-
rectly to market movements and considers the market partici-
pant's effort only indirectly. It does not consider the function
performed by local personnel nor the economic risks taken by
the different jurisdictions. Therefore, it does not clearly reflect
the input and investments of the taxpayers. Also, there is no
rational basis for believing that the value of the portfolio is par-
ticularly representative when the book is passed. It is just an
arbitrary choice detached from economic foundation. Finally,
most of the United States' major trading partners have ex-
pressed serious reservations about this approach.112 Thus, the
mark-to-market method should not be used in the global trading
area.
C. THE FORMULA APPORTIONMENT ALTERNATIVE
The formula apportionment method is the most suitable
method for both global twenty-four-hour trading and centralized
product management models of global trading. The formula ap-
portionment method divides profits among tax jurisdictions ac-
cording to a predetermined formula.1 13 It first defines the tax
base upon which the apportionment formula is to be applied,
114
and then applies a prearranged formula to that tax base. Factors
of production (e.g., labor, assets and capital) are usually used as
bases for constructing the formula."I5 Because labor is usually
112. See Ernst & Young Report, supra note 15, at "85, "86 (§ II.B.2.g.). The
countries surveyed include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Swit-
zerland and the United Kingdom.
113. For a full discussion of the formula apportionment method, see
Plambeck, Taxation Implications, supra note 3, at 1155-56.
114. The tax base is usually defined as the sum of the gains and losses from
trades and hedges, less allocable expenses such as interest, commissions to
salespeople, and also management and administrative expenses. Id. at 1156.
115. Factors of production are usually used as bases for the formula because
when unrelated parties in different tax jurisdictions enter into a joint venture
to conduct business, they might be expected to allocate the profits in accordance
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the most significant component in global trading, it typically
constitutes a major factor in the apportionment formula.11 6
If the formula apportionment method were applied to the
aforementioned Parent Corporation hypothetical, local profit al-
location would be disregarded. Instead, the tax authority could
define the tax base as the global income of the consolidated
group and thereby subject the entire income of Parent Corpora-
tion and its subsidiary to apportionment. If tax authorities use
the popular three-factors formula based on payroll, property,
and sales,117 it would compare the portion of those factors pres-
ent in the jurisdiction to the total amount of those factors in all
jurisdictions. The authorities would then allocate a certain
amount of income to a particular jurisdiction based on this
comparison. 118
The formula apportionment method offers many benefits,
most importantly, flexibility. This method is applicable to all
products and all forms of global trading.119 Once established, a
formula can be used for all three types of global trading. The
arm's length standard, on the other hand, requires the use of a
different standard for different situations.
Additionally, the formula apportionment method is more
efficient than the arm's length approach. Under formula appor-
with each one's relative contribution of inputs. See, e.g., Rollinson & Frisch,
Recent Issues in Transfer Pricing, Office of Tax Analysis Paper 61 (Nov. 1988).
116. Plambeck, Taxation Implications, supra note 3, at 1156 n.135, (citing R.
Gordon et al., Global Trading: Tax Issues in Intercompany Pricing of Securi-
ties Transactions, Paper delivered at the American Tax Institute in Europe con-
ference, Intercompany Pricing USA/Europe: Developments, Strategies and
Planning (Paris, June 18-19, 1990)). The Paper suggests an allocation formula
based on (1) relative trader compensation; (2) relative numbers of personnel,
including clearance and support; and (3) relative levels of interest and dividends
representing costs of risk capital. The three factors indicate economic risk -
namely activity, fixed presence, and risk assumed. Id.
117. These three factors are commonly used in state tax apportionment for-
mulas in the United States. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE ANN. § 25110
(Deerings 1992); Ill. Rev. Stat. § 3-304 (1991).
118. For example, suppose a multinational company is headquartered in the
United States. It has global income of $1,000,000. It has $10,000,000 in sales, of
which $500,000 is sold in the United States. Of its 1000 employees worldwide,
250 are located in the United States. Of its total assets valued at $4.0 billion, $3.0
billion are in the United States. Using an equally weighted Property-Payroll-
Sales three factors formula, $500,000 of the global income would be allocated as
taxable to the United States, computed as follows:
500,000 + 250 + 3 billion
1,000,000 1000 4 billion X 1,000,000
3
119. Plambeck, Taxation Implications, supra note 3, at 1156.
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tionment, taxpayers do not have to go through an annual prod-
uct-by-product or service-by-service search for comparable
uncontrolled transactions in order to establish their arm's
length price. Furthermore, taxpayers need not go through the
lengthy process of negotiation and litigation whenever the trans-
fer price they have established differs from the Service's deter-
mination. The formula apportionment method streamlines tax
administration and shortens dispute resolution and collection
cycles.
Moreover, formula apportionment makes theoretical sense.
This method recognizes that the profit of a company is gener-
ated by the factors of production employed - mainly property
(assets used), payroll (labor used) and profits as reflected by
sales (income). By allocating those factors of production among
the various tax jurisdictions, different jurisdictions can then
properly tax their share of the income of the global corporation
according to their contribution. In short, the more a jurisdiction
contributed to a company's success, the more the company's as-
sets, labor or income is expected to derive from that jurisdiction,
so that jurisdiction would in turn deserve to tax a larger share
vis-a-vis other jurisdictions. Therefore, the method fairly repre-
sents economic reality.
Critics of formula apportionment have advanced two major
arguments against its application to international transfer pric-
ing determinations. First, they argue that this method is not in-
ternationally accepted. Unless the United States reaches
agreements with all its major trading partners to change the uni-
versally accepted arm's length standard, it is argued, this ap-
proach could lead to international double taxation.
This criticism, however, fails to recognize the unique char-
acteristics of global trading. The formula apportionment
method, as applied to the global trading area, would have a mini-
mal negative effect on the international community if certain
procedural safeguards were applied. Unlike regular business
transactions, global trading is still in its infancy and is geograph-
ically limited to a small number of major trading centers. 120 Un-
like other kinds of business transactions for which a change in
standard would affect millions of taxpayers, adopting the
formula apportionment method at this time for global trading
120. The global marketplace is currently limited to major financial centers.
The largest are New York, London and Tokyo. Smaller centers include Hong
Kong, Sydney, Zurich, Chicago, Singapore and Toronto. COOPERS & LYBRAND,
supra note 27, at 5.
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purposes would probably affect only a handful of major U.S.
trading partners and a number of the more sophisticated inter-
national taxpayers. 121 Reducing double taxation, therefore,
would not be too difficult. In light of the benefits in administra-
tive cost savings and possible revenue gains that such a method
would bring to all parties involved, a multilateral tax treaty set-
ting forth the standard to be used and the industries to be af-
fected would be negotiable. This would provide taxpayers with
realistic protection against double taxation.
The second argument critics make against formula appor-
tionment is that countries would be unable to apportion factors
among jurisdictions and work out an arrangement for reporting
the necessary information. 122 Furthermore, they argue that
even if all countries accept formula apportionment as the uni-
versal standard, the choice of factors used in the formula would
be extremely subjective and perhaps even totally unrelated to
economic reality. Thus, the method would not clearly reflect
the respective contributions of the parties.
While these criticisms have merit, they are really blessings
in disguise. The criticisms do not really dispute the merits of
formula apportionment, but raise the potential difficulty of its
application. This, indeed, is a good argument for using formula
apportionment as the standard while preserving administrative
agreements as an option. If the few countries in which trading is
conducted agree on a treaty specifying the factors of allocation,
the treaty's formula would govern tax liability in each country.
Then, if the taxpayers did not agree that the formula reflects
economic reality, they could change the status quo by entering
into an international Advance Pricing Agreement. Individually
tailored agreements should be encouraged because they usually
can better reflect economic reality.
Global trading offers a unique opportunity for us to write on
a clean slate. Rarely do we find ourselves facing a totally new
kind of business transaction which requires an income allocation
121. Taxpayers who enter into international transactions are usually more
sophisticated than common individual taxpayers. And tax law compliance
should be less of a hurdle to those businesses than to most domestic family
businesses.
122. Countries with different economic characteristics would favor different
formulas in order to maximize revenue. A country with a consumer-driven
economy would put more emphasis on the sales factor whereas a country with a
production-driven economy would put more emphasis on the property or pay-
roll factors. This aspect of formula apportionment reinforces the importance of
agreement in this field between the financial centers listed in note 120, supra.
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method. The Treasury should seize this golden opportunity to
gain experience with the income allocation method in an inter-
national context. Once the usefulness of the formula apportion-
ment method is demonstrated in the global trading area, the
international community will be more willing to reexamine
whether the universally and historically favored arm's length
standard, accepted by international tax practitioners as a neces-
sary evil, can safely be rejected on a grand scale.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Having concluded that the formula apportionment method
and the APA procedure are more suitable to global trading than
the traditional ex post facto arm's length standard, this section
recommends a replacement for determining transfer prices in
global trading.
Under the proposed standard, the Service should first set up
a formula apportionment allocation method. Taxpayers should,
however, be able to opt out of this method by negotiating an
APA agreement with the Service. Big global traders will enter
into such agreements if they find the formula apportionment
method unfair. To make this method work, the APA procedure
should be refined to better accommodate global trading and to
better protect taxpayer confidentiality. Congressional action
could ensure that the APA agreement is covered by an excep-
tion to the Freedom of Information Act and that the Service can-
not use such tax information freely against taxpayers in future
disputes. 23
A. DEVELOPING A FAIR AND EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
FORMULA
The keystone of this system is the default formula appor-
tionment method. In order to apply formula apportionment on a
global basis, working with Congress the Treasury Department,
should develop a fair and equitable apportionment formula
method. This approach must address both the composition of
the calculable tax base and the composition of the applicable
formula.
The tax base for the formula should include all global trans-
actions of a taxpayer. Instead of requiring taxpayers to establish
an arm's length price for each transaction, however, the formula
apportionment method would apportion income based on a
123. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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preset formula. The formula apportionment method should be
used as long as it is consistently applied across all the tax juris-
dictions for bona fide business reasons.
Regarding the factors to use in the formula, a review of the
traditional state tax formula is instructive. States in the United
States have been using formula apportionment in their state tax
systems for decades. In its developed stage, a typical multi-state
apportionment method uses a three-factor formula to apportion
income. The three factors usually are payroll, property and
sales. This three-factor formula can be modified and made ap-
plicable in the global trading area.
A formula should be used to apportion global trading in-
come using the following three factors: (1) relative trader com-
pensation, (2) relative properties employed and (3) capital at
risk. The three factors reflect differently on the company's de-
gree of involvement and exposure in a jurisidiction: labor (activ-
ity level), assets (investment level) and capital (financial
involvement).
Relative trader compensation is similar to the payroll con-
cept in the traditional state tax apportionment context. Both
relative trader compensation and payroll reflect the activity
level of the profit center according to its services. Because com-
missions are often a function of sales volume, commissions are a
good yardstick for comparing activity levels between tax
jurisdictions.
The global property factor mirrors the one used in tradi-
tional state tax apportionment formulas. Because most global
traders, unlike their manufacturer counterparts, do not invest
heavily in machinery, their major property or production assets
will be reflected in their computers, software, support network
and inventory if there is any. The fixed cost of the different ju-
risdictions may be reflected by comparing the number of support
personnel or computers in those jurisdictions.
The amount of capital at risk reflects the risks which differ-
ent jurisdictions assume. Basically, the more capital at risk and
the longer the portfolio is exposed, the higher the percentage of
the profit that should be allocated there.
B. IMPROVING THE EXISTING ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENT
PROCEDURE
In addition to recognizing formula apportionment as a via-
ble alternative to the arm's length standard for satisfying the
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requirements of § 482, the Service should also work to improve
the existing Advance Pricing Agreement procedure.
To improve the protection the APA provides, the Treasury
should seek explicit congressional protection of APA agree-
ments from the general disclosure requirement of the FOIA.
Also, after the Service adopts the formula apportionment
method as the standard, a corresponding change should be made
to the APA procedure to allow the use of formula apportion-
ment as a negotiable method.
C. CONCLUSION
We have entered the global era and can no longer turn back.
Global trading, therefore, is here to stay. The traditional income
allocation methods under § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which use the arm's length standard for income allocation, are
not the best methods to use for this new kind of business trans-
action. The formula apportionment method, which allocates in-
come according to contributions of each taxing jurisdiction,
should be adopted as the prevailing standard. Taxpayers who
find the formula apportionment method unduly burdensome be-
cause of the danger of double taxation may take advantage of
the Advance Pricing Agreement procedure.
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